Spouses JOSEPHINE G.R. No. 160762
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
Chairperson,
Ynares-Santiago,
-
versus - Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ
Promulgated:
LEONARDO YAMANE,
Respondent. May
3, 2006
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PANGANIBAN, CJ:
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P |
roperty
purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is presumed to be conjugal
in nature. This presumption stands,
absent any clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the property is
paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held
liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some
advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the November 22, 2002 Decision[2] and the September 17, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 60939. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated
The CA denied
reconsideration in its
The
Facts
The undisputed factual findings of the CA are as follows:
“Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters (sic) parcel of lot
located at Res. Sec. ‘K’, Baguio City, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay
Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane, [respondent] herein, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12491.
“As
a result of a motion for execution of a charging lien filed by Atty. Guillermo
F. De Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841, entitled ‘Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v.
Cypress Corporation,’ which said counsel handled for the plaintiffs
therein, hereinafter collectively referred to as the Pucay sisters, the subject
property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000. The said property was scheduled to be sold at
public auction on
“Four days
prior to the auction sale, [respondent] filed a Third-Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop
the public auction on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property
and, therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal obligation of
the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff
proceeded with the auction sale despite [respondent’s] protest. The subject property was sold to spouses
Josephine [and] Henry Go (or [petitioners]) as highest bidder. No redemption having been made during the
one-year period, a Final Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale was eventually issued on
“On
“In their Answer filed
on December 10, 1984, [petitioners] denied the material allegations of the
complaint and interposed the following special affirmative defenses: that the cause of action was barred by prior
judgment; that [respondent] has not pursued any lawful remedy to annul the
execution proceeding; that there is no flaw or irregularity in the auction
sale; and that since the execution sale was made in accordance with Section 21,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is deemed final and any irregularity
committed in the course thereof will not vitiate its validity.
“On P200,000
as against a charging lien in the amount of P10,000.
“In its
In its Decision[6] dated
Upon receipt of the RTC Decision on
The CA reversed
the RTC’s Decision. The Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale dated
According
to the appellate court, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be
conjugal, unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been used
for the purpose. That the land was
acquired during the spouses’ coverture was sufficiently
established by the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale, both indicating that
Muriel Pucay Yamane was “married to
Leonardo Yamane”; and by the undisputed testimony of the previous owner,
Eugene Pucay. Because of petitioners’
failure to establish that the land in question had been acquired by Muriel
using her exclusive funds, the CA concluded that the contested land was
conjugal property.
The appellate court further held thus:
“x
x x [T]he disputed property being a
conjugal property of [respondent] and his wife, and absent any showing of some
advantage or benefit that accrued to their conjugal partnership from the
transaction between the Pucay sisters and Atty. De Guzman, the public auction
sale of the subject property in favor of [petitioners] is null and void.”[11]
Hence, this Petition.[12]
Petitioners submit the following
issues for our consideration:
“I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the appeal and in not dismissing the same, despite the fact that the respondent failed to perfect his appeal within the 15-day reglementary period set by the Rules of Court.
“II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject property as conjugal property, despite the existence of clear evidence showing that the subject property is the exclusive paraphernal property of Muriel who, even during her lifetime, always claimed the said property as her own exclusive paraphernal property and not as property co-owned with her husband, the respondent herein.
“III. The Court of Appeals, assuming, ex grati argumenti, that the subject property is conjugal property between respondent and Muriel, gravely erred in ruling that the same cannot answer for the charging lien of Atty. Guillermo de Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841.”[13]
In the main, they posit two issues. They raise, first, the procedural
question of whether the CA erred in giving due course to respondent’s lapsed
appeal; and, second, the substantive issue of whether the subject
property is conjugal or paraphernal.
The Petition has no merit.
Procedural Issue:
Whether Respondent’s Appeal
Should Be Given Due Course
Petitioners
contend that the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal filed by
respondent beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
Concededly, he received a copy of the RTC Decision on
The perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional; and the lapse of the
appeal period of fifteen days deprives a court of the jurisdiction to alter a
final judgment.[15]
There have been exceptions, however,
in which the Court dispensed with
technical infirmities and gave due course to tardy appeals. In some of those instances, the
presence of any justifying circumstance recognized by law -- such as fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence -- properly vested the judge with
discretion to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time.[16] In other instances, lapsed appeals were
allowed in order to serve substantial justice, upon consideration of a) matters
of life, liberty, honor or property; b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; c) the merits of the case; d) causes not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence
of the party that would be favored by the suspension of the rules; e) the
failure to show that the review being sought was merely frivolous and dilatory;
and f) the fact that the other party would not be unjustly prejudiced.[17]
Indeed,
in some
exceptional cases, the Court has allowed the relaxation of the rules regulating
the reglementary periods of appeal.
These exceptions were cited in
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery v. CA,[18] from which
we quote:
“In Ramos vs. Bagasao,
the
Court excused the delay of four days in the filing of the notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court had
been served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record was
already dead. The new counsel could only
file the appeal four days after the prescribed reglementary
period was over. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
the Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic
despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since
the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its
name and had since then been devoted for public purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, a tardy appeal was accepted
considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially
settled with finality in another case, and a dismissal of the
appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make
the same reparation to the appellee.”[19]
We believe that a suspension of the Rules is similarly
warranted in the present controversy. We
have carefully
studied the merits of the case and noted that the review being sought has not
been shown to be merely frivolous and dilatory.
The Court has come to the conclusion that
the
Decision of the RTC, Branch 4 (in Civil Case No. 417-R), must be set aside.
It would be far better and more prudent to attain the ends of
justice, rather than to dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave
injustice in the process. Thus, we would
rather excuse a technical lapse and afford respondent a review of the case on
appeal.
Substantive Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?
The purchase of
the property had been concluded in 1967, before the Family
Code took effect on
Article 160 of the New
Civil Code provides that “all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”[21] As a conditio sine qua non for
the operation of this article in favor of the conjugal partnership,[22] the party who invokes the
presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage.[23]
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does
not operate if there is no showing of when the
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.[24] Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only
with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence.[25] There must be strict proof of the exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses,[26] and the burden of proof
rests upon the party asserting it.[27]
The CA committed no error in
declaring that the parcel of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They
acquired it from Eugene Pucay on
Petitioners
concede that the property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage
of Muriel to respondent.[30] Nonetheless, they insist that it belonged
exclusively to her for the following reasons:
First. Respondent never denied nor opposed her claim
in Civil Case No. 505-R, which she had filed during her lifetime; or in AG-GR
Sp. No. 01616 (entitled “Muriel Pucay Yamane v. Josephine Go”), that the
disputed parcel of land was her exclusive paraphernal property. They allege that his failure to file a denial
or opposition in those cases is tantamount to a judicial admission that
militates against his belated claim.
Second. The Deed of Absolute Sale of the property is
in the sole name of Muriel. Petitioners
posit that, had the spouses jointly purchased this piece of land, the document
should have indicated this fact or carried the name of respondent as buyer.
Third. The failure of respondent to redeem the
parcel of land within the redemption period after the auction sale indicated
that he was not its co-owner.
We will
discuss the three arguments seriatim.
Unilateral Declaration
Respondent’s
interest cannot be prejudiced by the claim of Muriel in her Complaint in Civil
Case No. 505-R that the subject parcel of land was her paraphernal
property. Significantly, the nature
of a property -- whether
conjugal or paraphernal -- is determined by law and not by the will of one of
the spouses.[31] Thus, no unilateral declaration by one spouse
can change the character of a conjugal property.[32]
Besides, the issue presented in Civil
Case No. 505-R was not the nature of the subject piece of land being
levied upon, but whether
Atty. Guillermo de Guzman was entitled to a charging lien. In that case, Muriel claimed that she had not
officially retained him as counsel, and that no lawyer-client relationship had
been established between them.[33]
Deed and Title in the
Name of One Spouse
Further, the mere registration of a property in the name of
one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature.[34] Hence, it cannot be contended in the present
case that, simply because the title and the Deed of Sale covering the parcel of
land were in the name of Muriel alone, it was therefore her personal and
exclusive property. In
concluding that it was paraphernal, the trial court’s reliance on Stuart v. Yatco[35] was
clearly erroneous.
As stated earlier, to rebut the
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, petitioners must present
clear and convincing evidence. We affirm
and quote below, for easy reference, the relevant dispositions of the CA:
“x
x x. We are unable to go along with
[petitioners’] contention that the subject property was acquired by Muriel with
her exclusive funds. Mere registration
of the contested property in the name of the wife is not sufficient to establish
the paraphernal nature of the property.
This reminds Us of the teaching in the recent case of Diancin v.
Court of Appeals, that all the property acquired by the spouses, regardless
of in whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. To quote:
“As
a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in whose
name the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife. In the
case at bar, the fishpond lease right is not paraphernal having been acquired
during the coverture of the marriage between Matilde and Tiburcio, which was on
“x
x x [T]his presumption is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and
convincing evidence. The burden of
proving that the property belongs exclusively to the wife rests upon the party
asserting
it. Mere assertion of the property’s
paraphernal nature is not sufficient.”
“The
record as well as the foregoing established jurisprudence lead us to conclude
that the contested property was indeed acquired during the marriage of herein
[respondent] and Muriel. To prove that
it is nonetheless paraphernal property, it is incumbent upon [petitioners] to
adduce strong, clear and convincing evidence that Muriel bought the same with
her exclusive funds. [Petitioners]
failed to discharge the burden. Nowhere
in the evidence presented by them do We find any indication that the land in
question was acquired by Muriel with her exclusive funds. The presumption not having been overthrown,
the conclusion is that the contested land is conjugal property.”[36]
Non-Redemption
After the Auction
The non-redemption of the property by respondent within the period
prescribed by law did not, in any way, indicate the absence of his right or
title to it. Contrary to
petitioners’ allegation, the fact is that he filed a Third-Party Claim[37]
with the sheriff, upon learning of the levy and impending auction sale. This fact was specifically admitted by
petitioners.[38] Respondent claimed that the parcel of land
was conjugal, and that he could not answer for the separate obligation of his
wife and her sisters.[39] Notwithstanding his claim, the disputed piece
of land was sold at a public auction on
Likewise, in
his Opposition (Answer) to the Petition in LRC File Adm. Case No. 2288,[41]
respondent raised the issue of the conjugal nature of the property and reserved
his right to file an independent action to annul the auction sale. In its March 30, 1983 Order,[42]
however, Branch 5 of the RTC of Baguio City did not rule on either the actual
ownership or the nature of the parcel of land.
Rather, it granted the Petition to issue a new certificate of title in
favor of Petitioner Josephine Mendoza Go.
It found that, under Section 75 of Presidential Decree 1529, respondent
had no legal standing to question the auction sale, because he was not the registered
owner of the property. Instead, his
right to prove his claim in a separate and independent action was upheld.[43] Thus, he instituted the present case for
annulment and cancellation of the auction sale.
The foregoing points clearly explain
the failure of respondent to redeem the property. Misplaced is petitioners’ emphasis on his
failure to do so within the period required by law, because redemption in this
case would have been inconsistent with his claim that the sale was invalid.[44] Redemption would have served as an implied
admission of the regularity of the sale and estopped him from later impugning
its validity on that ground.[45]
Since
petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that the property is
paraphernal, the presumption that it is conjugal therefore stands. The next question before us is, whether the
charging lien of Atty. de Guzman may be properly enforced against the piece of
land in question.
Charging
Lien Not Chargeable
Against
Conjugal Property
It is
indisputable that the services of Atty. de Guzman were acquired during the
marriage of respondent and Muriel. The
lawyer’s legal services were engaged to recover from Cypress Corporation (in
Civil Case No. 1841) the balance of the purchase price of the sale of the exclusive
property of Muriel and her sisters.[46] The recovery was done during the marriage.[47]
The CA
elucidated on this matter as follows:
“x
x x. The contract or transaction between
Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for the
exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel
was acting privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters
in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever expenses were incurred
by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters’ private and exclusive
interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be charged
against the contested conjugal property.
“Even
on the remote assumption that the conjugal property could be held liable, levy
on execution of the same property should still be denied in accordance with the
ruling in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De
Garcia that before a conjugal property could be held liable for the
obligation contracted by a spouse, there must be a showing of some advantage or
benefit that accrued to the conjugal partnership. Concededly, the burden is on the
[petitioners] to prove that the services rendered by Atty. De Guzman in
handling Civil Case No. 1841 for the Pucay sisters had, somehow, redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of herein [respondent] and Muriel. This onus, [petitioners], however, failed to
discharge.”[48]
We find no
reason to deviate from the CA’s findings, which are amply supported by
evidence. The expenses incurred by
Muriel for
the recovery of the balance of the purchase price of her paraphernal property
are her exclusive responsibility.[49] This piece of land may not be used to pay for
her indebtedness, because her obligation has not been shown to be one of the
charges against the conjugal partnership.[50] Moreover, her rights to the property are
merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Under the New Civil Code, a wife
may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for
the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband’s
failure to deliver the needed sum;[51]
when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courts[52]
or by the husband;[53]
or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.[54] Failure to establish any of these
circumstances in the present case means that the conjugal asset may not be
bound to answer for Muriel’s personal obligation.
The power of
the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging
to the judgment debtor alone.[55] In this case, therefore, the property --
being conjugal in nature -- cannot be levied upon.[56]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED,
and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chairperson, First Division
W E C O N C U R:
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-22.
[2] Annex “L” of Petition; id. at 62-72. Penned by Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico (Division chairperson) and Regalado E. Maambong (member).
[3] Annex “N” of Petition; id. at 82.
[4] Assailed CA Decision, p. 10; id. at 71.
[5]
[6] Annex “A” of petitioners’ Memorandum; rollo, unnumbered. Penned by acting Presiding Judge Robert T. Cawed.
[7] Rollo, p. 53.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Assailed CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 71.
[12] This case was deemed submitted for
decision on
[13] Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 11; rollo, unnumbered.
[14] Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 3.
[15] J. Feria and M.C. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, Vol. 2, 163 (2001); Neypes v. CA, GR No. 141524,
[16] Catubay v. NLRC, 330 SCRA 440,
[17] Dela Cruz v. Sison, GR No. 142464, September 26, 2005; Barnes v. Hon. Padilla, 461 SCRA 533, June 28, 2005 (citing Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 540, June 20, 2003 and Aguam v. CA, 332 SCRA 784, May 31, 2000).
[18]
344 SCRA 769,
[19]
[20] M. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 94 (3rd ed., 1999).
[21] The provision is reproduced in Article 116 of the Family Code, which states: “All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.”
[22]
Flora v. Prado, 420 SCRA 396,
[23]
Acabal v. Acabal, 454 SCRA 555,
[24]
Phil. National Bank v. CA, 153 SCRA 435,
[25]
Wong v. IAC, 200 SCRA 792,
[26]
Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356,
[27]
Tan v. CA, 339 Phil. 423,
[28] Annex “P” of the Petition; rollo, p. 87.
[29] See Annex “2-A” of respondent’s Comment, p. 2; rollo, p. 148.
[30]
See petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 22; rollo, unnumbered.
[31]
Villanueva v. CA, 427 SCRA 439,
[32]
[33]
See Annex “C” of Petition; rollo, pp. 34-38.
[34]
Acabal v. Acabal, supra note 20 (citing Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154, August 17, 1983 and Bucoy v. Paulino, 23 SCRA 248, April 26,
1968).
[35]
4 SCRA 1143,
[36] Assailed CA Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 68-69.
[37]
Third Party Claim dated
[38]
See Answer dated
[39]
See Complaint dated
[40] Annex “1-F” of Respondent’s Comment; rollo, pp. 141-142. The third “Whereas” clause states that the sale was made in accordance with Rule 39, Section 17 of the Rules of Court; Article 161 of the Civil Code; and Fulgencio v. Gatchalian, 21 Phil. 252, January 23, 1912.
[41] In re: Petition for the Issuance of New Title, filed by Josephine Mendoza Go against Muriel Pucay Yamane and Leonardo Yamane before the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region of Baguio City, Branch V.
[42] Annex “2-A” of respondent’s Comment; rollo, pp. 147-150.
[43]
[44]
Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 563,
[45] Perez v. CA, 464 SCRA 89, July 22, 2005; Aclon v. CA, 387 SCRA 415, August 20, 2002; Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 563, June 30, 1987.
[46]
See Reply dated
[47]
[48] Assailed CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 70.
[49] A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Phils., Vol. I, 456 (1990).
[50] Civil Code, Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for the following:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by
the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind
the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage,
from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of
the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made
during the marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or the
wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the
education of the children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate children
of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a
professional, vocational or other course.
[51] Id., Art. 115.
[52]
[53] Id., Art. 168.
[54] Id., Art. 174.
[55]
Republic v. Enriquez, 166 SCRA 608,
[56]
Johnson and Johnson (Phils.) v. CA, 330 Phil. 856,